Why Did South Vietnam Reject The October 1972 Draft Agreement

Posted by on Apr 15, 2021 in Uncategorized | 0 comments

After winning the 1968 presidential election, Richard Nixon became president of the United Emirates in January 1969. He replaced U.S. Ambassador Harriman with Henry Cabot Lodge Jr, who was later replaced by David Bruce. Again this year, the NLF established a revolutionary interim government (PRG) to obtain government status in the talks. However, the main negotiations that led to the agreement did not take place at all at the peace conference, but took place in secret negotiations between Kissinger and Léc Thé, which began on 4 August 1969. The North Vietnams rejected the U.S. peace proposal when they presented theirs. Hanoi insisted on the withdrawal of American troops and allied troops from all over Indochina, without any conditions and the immediate resignation of the Thieu regime. The Paris peace accords effectively distanced the United States from the Vietnam conflict. However, the provisions of the agreement were regularly flouted by both the North Vietnamese government and the South Vietnamese government, which did not elicit a reaction from the United States and eventually led the Communists to expand the territory they controlled until the end of 1973. North Vietnamese forces gradually built their military infrastructure in the areas they controlled and, two years later, were able to launch a successful offensive that ended the status of an independent country in South Vietnam.

Fighting began almost immediately after the signing of the agreement, due to a series of reciprocal reprisals, and the war resumed in March 1973. [3] On January 15, 1973, President Nixon announced the suspension of offensive actions against North Vietnam. On January 23, Kissinger and Tha met again and signed a contract substantially identical to the project three months earlier. The agreement was signed by the heads of the official delegations on 27 January 1973 at the Majestic Hotel in Paris. Negotiations that led to the agreement began in 1968 after several long delays. As a result of the agreement, the International Monitoring Commission (ICC) was replaced by the International Monitoring Commission (ICCS) to comply with the agreement. The main negotiators of the agreement were Henry Kissinger, U.S. national security adviser, and Lé C Théc, a member of the North Vietnamese political bureau.

Both men were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973 for their efforts, although he refused to accept it. Nixon asked the eminent Asian-American politician Anna Chennault to be his “channel to Mr. Thieu”; Chennault agreed and regularly reported to John Mitchell that Thieu had no intention of attending a peace conference. On November 2, Chennault told the South Vietnamese ambassador: “I just heard from my boss in Albuquerque, who says his boss [Nixon] is going to win. And you`ll tell your boss [Thieu] to hold on for a while longer. [8] Johnson learned about the NSA and was furious that Nixon had “blood on his hands” and that Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen agreed with Johnson that such an action was a “betrayal.” [9] [10] [11] Defence Minister Clark Clifford considered this to be an unlawful violation of the Logan Act. [12] In response, President Johnson ordered the listening of members of the Nixon campaign. [13] [14] Dallek wrote that Nixon`s efforts “probably made no difference” because Thieu was unwilling to participate in the talks and there was little chance of reaching an agreement before the elections; However, his use of the information provided by Harlow and Kissinger was morally questionable and Vice President Hubert Humphrey`s decision not to make Nixon`s actions public is “an unusual act of political decency.” [15] According to Finnish historian Jussi Hanhimki, South Vietnam was put under pressure because of the triangular diplomacy that isolated it to accept an agreement that virtually ensured its collapse. [21] During the negotiations, Kissinger stated that 18 months after an agreement, the United States would not intervene militarily, but that it could intervene before.